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Abstract
This paper applies clustering analysis to the Colombian armed con°ict. Indeed, when
applied to a FARC terrorist act database, this statistical procedure ¯nds a natural clus-
tering of the di®erent FARC units according to the di®erent types of terrorist acts they
commit and identi¯es the military hard core of the FARC. The facts revealed in this
paper should be useful not only for future military strategies, but also to determine a
better priorization and geographical allocation of the scarce military resources.
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11. INTRODUCTION
Colombia has experienced a severe domestic con°ict during the previous decades. The main
actors of the con°ict are, on one side, the FARC-EP (Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia-
People's Army) and the ELN (National Liberation Army), the two major leftist guerrilla
groups, and, on the other side, the legitimate armed forces and the majority of civil society1.
Despite the fact that an increasing percentage of GDP has been systematically allocated
to military spending during the previous years, the con°ict has lasted almost 5 decades. Of
course, the irregular nature of the con°ict makes victory extremely di±cult for the legitimate
army forces. Moreover, it can be argued that even though the fraction of GDP that is allocated
to military spending has increased during the previous years, it is still insu±cient to guarantee
victory. Yet, the irregularity of the con°ict and the scarcity of resources is something that
Colombian society (both civil and military) has to live with. Hence, the development of
di®erent intelligence tools aimed at priorizing the use of scarce military resources (while taking
into consideration the irregular and guerilla warfare type of con°ict that Colombia endures) is
a must at this stage of the war. The purpose of this paper is to provide one such tool.
The tool is a simple statistical procedure known as clustering analysis. It can be used
to identify certain specialization patterns among the basic military units of the FARC, the
major irregular group ¯ghting the Colombian armed forces. Indeed, when applied to a FARC
terrorist act database, this statistical procedure ¯nds a natural grouping of the di®erent FARC
units according to the di®erent types of terrorist acts they commit. This information reveals
patterns that are useful to determine a better priorization and geographical allocation of scarce
military resources.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section explains the clustering analysis method-
ology. Section three describes the data set. Section four presents the results and the last section
concludes.
2. CLUSTERING ANALYSIS
This technique organizes in di®erent groups (clusters) any collection of mathematically char-
acterizable objects. Indeed, if it possible to characterize every object in a collection with a
vector, then the technique is able to segregate into di®erent groups (clusters) all the objects
of the collection by minimizing the mathematical distance between the resulting groups. Even
though there are many de¯nitions of mathematical distance, the Euclidean distance is used in
this paper due to its simplicity and common use in clustering techniques.
The following algorithm describes the methodology:
1. Let N be the number of vector/objects in the collection.
2. Calculate the Euclidean distance between every possible pair of the N vectors that de-
scribe the N objects of the collection.
3. Let ¢ be an N £N matrix registering the distance between object i and object j [d(i;j)]
in row i and column j. Note that ¢ is symmetric with zero's on the diagonal.
1There are also right-winged paramilitary groups but they are not the purpose of this paper.
24. Search for the shortest distance in ¢. Let x and y be the two objects with the shortest
distance in between:
d(x;y) = Min [d(i;j)] Y i;j = 1:::N
5. Let x and y conform the cluster xy.
6. Eliminate the 2 rows and 2 columns corresponding to object x and object y from ¢.
With the distance between cluster xy and the remaining N ¡ 2 objects, add a new row
and column to ¢. The distance between cluster xy and any other object of the remaining
collection is the largest of the distances between x and the other object and y and the
other object:
d(xy;z) = Maxfd(x;z);d(y;z)g
7. Let N = N ¡ 1 and go back to step 4.
It is up to the researcher to decide at which iteration to stop, according to the number of
clusters he/she aims to obtain.
Consider the following example. There are four objects (A;B;C;D) 2 R2 characterizable
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d(A;B) = d(B;A) =
p
(3 ¡ 5)2 + (2 ¡ 4)2 = 2:8
d(A;C) = d(C;A) =
p
(3 ¡ 6)2 + (2 ¡ 5)2 = 4:2
d(A;D) = d(D;A) =
p
(3 ¡ 10)2 + (2 ¡ 9)2 = 9:9
d(B;C) = d(C;B) =
p
(5 ¡ 6)2 + (4 ¡ 5)2 = 1:4
d(B;D) = d(D;B) =
p
(5 ¡ 10)2 + (4 ¡ 9)2 = 7:1
d(C;D) = d(D;C) =
p
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The shortest distance in ¢ is given by d(B;C) = d(C;B) = 1:4. Hence, BC is a cluster






























d(A;BC) = d(BC;A) = maxfd(A;B);d(A;C)g = maxf2:8;4:2g = 4:2
d(A;D) = d(D;A) = 9:9










The shortest distance in ¢ is given by d(A;BC) = d(BC;A) = 4:2. Hence, ABC is a cluster
and there are now only two objects in the collection: (ABC;D) 2 R2. By construction, during
the next iteration the two remaining objects will be grouped into one big cluster containing
all the objects of the original collection: (ABCD). Note then that the methodology reveals 4
possible groupings:
1. Four clusters:
² Cluster 1: A
² Cluster 2: B
² Cluster 3: C
² Cluster 4: D
2. Three clusters:
4² Cluster 1: A
² Cluster 2: BC
² Cluster 3: D
3. Two clusters:
² Cluster 1: ABC
² Cluster 2: D
4. One cluster:
² Cluster 1: ABCD
Again, the researcher decides at which grouping level to stop. Given that the ¯rst and last
levels are irrelevant, the researcher has to choose between two or three clusters [i.e. between
(A;BC;D) or (ABC;D)].
3. DATA
The database employed in this paper was obtained from the Ministry of Defense and the
Ministry of Interior and Justice of Colombia. It includes all o±cially reported terrorist acts
committed by the FARC between January 2/1999 and February 9/2003. The database contains
5819 acts which can be divided into 117 di®erent types (ex: kidnappings, massacres, blowings
of oil ducts, blowings of energy towers, attacks against military infrastructure, etc.). The
database is described by the following simple statistics across the di®erent types of acts:
² Minimum frequency = 1 act2
² Maximum frequency = 610 acts3
² Median = 5 acts.
² Mean = 49.5 acts
For the purposes of this paper it is necessary that every act in the database contains the
following information4:
² Type of act
² Location (city/town and state)
2Corresponding to Armed Strike.
3Corresponding to Combats with Colombian Armed Force.
4Of course, additional information for each act is also available from the database (ex: date, army brigade
with jurisdiction in the location where the act was committed, etc).
5² FARC unit committing the act
Those acts with missing information were eliminated from the database. This reduced
the total number of acts in the database to 3896. Given that several FARC units operate
in the same area and systematically use a hit and run strategy (due to the guerrilla-
warfare nature of the con°ict), sometimes it is very di±cult for the Ministry of Defense
to identify accurately the unit responsible for some of the terrorist acts committed by
the FARC. Thus, the information from the Ministry of Defense was double checked
for consistency with that from the Ministry of Interior and Justice (which comes from
alternative sources).
4. RESULTS
Note that the database allows the vector-characterization of every FARC unit according to the
number of terrorist acts they committed per every di®erent type of act in the database, between
January 2/1999 and February 9/2003. In consequence, the clustering technique described above
was used to obtain a natural clustering of the di®erent FARC units according to the di®erent
types of terrorist acts they perpetrated between January 2/1999 and February 9/2003.
The procedure reveals nine di®erent clusters of FARC units (see Table 1).
Table 1
Cluster # of units % of acts Average acts per cluster member
1 66 81:55% 48:14
2 8 1:36% 6:63
3 14 6:21% 17:29
4 10 6:55% 25:50
5 7 1:87% 10:43
6 7 0:33% 1:86
7 9 1:05% 4:56
8 9 0:54% 2:33
9 9 0:54% 2:33
Total 139 100%
Interestingly, more than 80% of all the terrorist acts committed by the FARC during the
period of analysis is concentrated in cluster number 1, with 66 units (or 47% of the FARC
units). The average number of terrorist acts committed by the units in cluster number 1 is
48.14, almost twice as much as the second highest average. Now, clusters number 3 and 4 (with
14 and 10 units, respectively) concentrate jointly almost 13% of the attacks and, after cluster
number 1, are the only two other clusters with a signi¯cant percentage of the acts. Indeed,
the average number of acts committed by the members of clusters 3 and 4 is 17.29 and 25.50,
respectively, much higher than the average for the other clusters (except that of cluster 1).
In sum, clusters 1, 3 and 4, with 65% of the total number of FARC units, carried out 94%
of all the acts perpetrated by this terrorist group. The units in cluster 1 alone participated
with more than 80% of the terrorist acts. Those FARC units belonging to all other clusters
6(and representing 35% of all FARC units) participated with less than 6% of all the terrorist
acts.
These results reveal an interesting specialization pattern among the FARC. Apparently, the
units belonging to cluster 1 are military in nature. In other words, they are in charge of using
all types of terrorist acts to attack civilian society, destroy its infrastructure and combat the
legitimate armed forces of Colombia. The units belonging to clusters 3 and 4 are also military
oriented but not as much as those in cluster 1. They are probably specialized only in certain
sorts of military activities. In contrast, the units belonging to the other clusters are probably
dedicated to non-military activities (political, logistic support, ¯nancial support, etc.).
To identify this specialization pattern more clearly each cluster should be studied separately.
Appendix 1 exhibits the complete statistical output for each of the FARC unit clusters. Note
that those FARC units belonging to cluster 1 are responsible (in the sample of the database) for
82.80% of all masacres, 86.63% of all civilian murders, 79.53% of all kidnappings and 79.01% of
all attacks against towns and villages. Moreover, they are responsible for 89.02% of all vehicle
theft/retention, 76.34% of all explosions, 76.96% of all bridge and road blowings, 82.49% of
all oil duct attacks and 64.09% of all attacks against the electric infrastructure. Additionally,
they concentrate 87.54% of all combats with the Colombian armed forces. It is important to
highlight that this type of terrorist act represents almost 17% of the activities of cluster 1
units. As expected above, the units in cluster 1 make up the military hard core of the FARC.
They are devoted to in°ict terrorism upon civilian society, destroy its economic infrastructure
and combat the armed forces of the State.
Note, however, that the FARC units belonging to cluster 3 are responsible for 26.36% of all
attacks against the electric infrastructure, 10.99% of all attacks against oil ducts and 9.60%
of all bridge and road blowings. On the other hand, those FARC units belonging to cluster 4
are responsible for 18.96% of all explosions. Moreover, this type of terrorist act concentrates
44.31% of the activities of cluster 4 units. As envisaged above, the FARC units in clusters 3 and
4 are also military oriented though not as much as those in cluster 1. They only specialize in
some sort of speci¯c military activity. Speci¯cally, those units belonging to cluster 3 specialize
in reinforcing the attacks of cluster 1 against the economic infrastructure of the country while
those in cluster 4 devote their acts to the use of explosive materials.
A detailed analysis of the other clusters is left to the reader.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Clustering analysis is a simple statistical tool that divides into di®erent groups (clusters)
any collection of mathematically characterizable objects. This paper applies such tool to
the Colombian armed con°ict. Indeed, when applied to a FARC terrorist act database, this
statistical procedure ¯nds a natural clustering of the di®erent FARC units according to the
di®erent types of terrorist acts they commit. The facts revealed in this paper should be
useful not only for future military strategies, but also to determine a better priorization and
geographical allocation of the scarce military resources.
For instance, the paper identi¯es a cluster of FARC units devoted to in°icting terrorism
upon civilian society, to destroying the economic infrastructure of the country and to combating
the legitimate armed forces of Colombia. Surprisingly, this cluster or military hard core of the
7FARC only represents 44% of all FARC units. The paper also identi¯es two other clusters whose
units specialize in certain sorts of military operations (attacks against infrastructure and use
of explosive material). Again, these two clusters only represent 15% of all the FARC units. All
other clusters seem to specialize in non-military activities (political, logistic, ¯nancial, etc).
From a military strategy and resource allocation point of view, devoting military personnel,
equipment and resources to pursue, disarticulate and eliminate the FARC units belonging to
these three clusters (but especially to the ¯rst one) is the most e±cient policy (and a priority).
Indeed, aiming and concentrating scarce military resources on the FARC military hard core,
the one that has been identi¯ed in this paper, seems to be a wise choice. Immediate military
confrontation of the FARC units belonging to all the other clusters is not e±cient. Instead,
operations intensive in ¯nancial and urban intelligence should be used to close in on these
non-military oriented units in order to disarticulate them.
It must be emphasized that the paper employs the simplest de¯nition of mathematical
distance (Euclidean) and also the easiest clustering analysis procedure. This is not a problem
given that the object of this paper is simply to illustrate the advantages for military strategy
and resource allocation of the clustering analysis tool. More sophisticated clustering analysis
algorithms are welcome to improve upon the results.
Finally, the usefulness of the results revealed by any statistical tool is a function of the
quality of the data. Of course, data from any armed con°ict is not of the best quality. Even
though a big e®ort was done to clean and check for consistency with alternative sources the
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97. APPENDIX 1: CLUSTERING BY FARC UNITS
7.1. Cluster 1
Cluster members*: (1), (2),(3), (5), (6), (7), (8), (10), (13), (14), (15), (17), (18), (19), (21), (22),
(23), (24), (25) (26), (28), (29), (30), (31), (33), (34), (35), (36), (37), (38),(40), (41), (42), (45),(47),
(48), (49), (50), (51), (54), (55), (56), (58), (59), (60), (61), (16, 39, 43, 44), (3, 15), (38, 52), (39,
43, 44), (45, Alfonso Castellanos), (5, 34), (6, Col. M. Jacobo Arenas), (61, 13, 32, 49), (8, Col. M.
Jacobo Arenas),(8, 60), (Abelardo Romero), (Armando R¶ ³os), (Aurelio Rodr¶ ³guez), (Col. M. Daniel
Aldana), (Col. M. Te¶ o¯lo Forero), (CP. Abelardo Romero), (CP. Policarpa Salavarrieta), (CP. Victor
Saavedra), (Jacinto Matallana)
Type of act # of acts %of acts in cluster % of acts in sample
Combats with Colombian Armed
Forces
534 16;81 87;54
Vehicle theft/retention 462 14;54 89;02
Use of explosive element 455 14;32 76;34
Massacres 207 6;52 82;80
Bridges and roads blown 146 4;85 76;96
Oil ducts blown 147 4;85 82;49
Town and village harassment 149 4;69 79;68
Civilian murders 149 4;69 86;63
Electric infrastructure attacks 141 4;44 64;09
Kidnappees liberated 140 4;41 86;96
Kidnappings 136 4;28 79;53
Attacks to public force 135 4;25 82;32
Gas cylinder recovery/theft 100 3;15 89;29




Attacks to public force installa-
tions
49 1;54 69;01
Vehicle burn 33 1;04 82;50
Assault on tolls and banks 31 0;98 88;57
Attacks to civilian installations 25 0;79 65;79
Electoral material theft/burn 14 0;44 82;35
Fugue 6 0;19 100;00
Armed strike 1 0;03 100;00
* Each group in parenthesis (x, y, z) was treated as a single unit if x, y and z operate jointly.
107.2. Cluster 2
Cluster members*: (11), (12), (20), (46), (13, 63), (2, 3), (41, 59), (Argelino Godoy)
Type of act # of acts %of acts in cluster % of acts in sample
Massacres 16 30;19 6;40
Combats with Colombian Armed
Forces
9 16;98 1;48
Electric infrastructure attacks 7 13;21 3;18
Oil ducts blown 7 13;21 3;66
Kidnappees liberated 3 5;66 1;86
Attacks to public force 2 3;77 1;22
Attacks to civilian installations 2 3;77 5;26
Vehicle theft/retention 2 3;77 0;39
Attacks to public force installa-
tions
1 1;89 1;41
Town and village attacks 1 1;89 1;23
Use of explosive element 1 1;89 0;17
Kidnappings 1 1;89 0;58
Bridges and roads blown 1 1;89 0;56
Assault on tolls and banks 0 0;00 0;00




Fugue 0 0;00 0;00
Town and village harassment 0 0;00 0;00
Electoral material theft/burn 0 0;00 0;00
Armed strike 0 0;00 0;00
Vehicle burn 0 0;00 0;00
Gas cylinder recovery/theft 0 0;00 0;00
* Each group in parenthesis (x, y, z) was treated as a single unit if x, y and z operate jointly.
117.3. Cluster 3
Cluster members*: (4), (9), (16), (52), (26, 27), (26, 31), (53, 54), (C.P. Joaqu¶ ³n Ball¶ en), (H¶ eroes de
Marquetalia)
Type of act # of acts %of acts in cluster % of acts in sample
Electric infrastructure attacks 58 23;97 26;36
Combats with Colombian Armed
Forces
25 10;33 4;10
Vehicle theft/retention 24 9;92 4;62
Oil ducts blown 21 8;68 10;99
Bridges and roads blown 17 7;02 9;60
Use of explosive element 14 5;79 2;35
Civilian murders 12 4;96 6;42
Massacres 11 4;55 4;40
Town and village harassment 9 3;72 5;23
Kidnappings 9 3;72 5;26
Attacks to public force 8 3;31 4;88
Kidnappees liberated 7 2;89 4;35
Gas cylinder recovery/theft 7 2;89 6;25
Attacks to public force installa-
tions
5 2;07 7;04
Town and village attacks 4 1;65 4;94
Assault on tolls and banks 3 1;24 8;57




Electoral material theft/burn 2 0;83 11;76
Vehicle burn 2 0;83 5;00
Fugue 0 0;00 0;00
Armed strike 0 0;00 0;00
* Each group in parenthesis (x, y, z) was treated as a single unit if x, y and z operate jointly.
127.4. Cluster 4
Cluster members*: (27), (32), (44), (53), (64), (4, 7), (Alirio Torres), (CP. Alonso Cort¶ es), (F.U.
Antonio Nari~ no)
Type of act # of acts %of acts in cluster % of acts in sample
Use of explosive element 113 44;31 18;96
Combats with Colombian Armed
Forces
20 7;84 3;28
Vehicle theft/retention 18 7;06 3;47
Civilian murders 12 4;71 6;42
Kidnappings 12 4;71 7;02
Attacks to public force 11 4;31 6;71
Massacres 11 4;31 4;40
Electric infrastructure attacks 10 3;92 4;55
Town and village harassment 8 3;14 4;65
Oil ducts blown 7 2;75 3;66
Bridges and roads blown 7 2;75 3;95
Town and village attacks 6 2;35 7;41
Kidnappees liberated 5 1;96 3;11
Gas cylinder recovery/theft 4 1;57 3;57






Attacks to civilian installations 2 0;78 5;26
Vehicle burn 2 0;78 5;00
Electoral material theft/burn 1 0;39 5;88
Assault on tolls and banks 0 0;00 0;00
Fugue 0 0;00 0;00
Armed strike 0 0;00 0;00
* Each group in parenthesis (x, y, z) was treated as a single unit if x, y and z operate jointly.
137.5. Cluster 5
Cluster members*: (1, 7), (29, 64), (33, 45), (9, 34), (Arturo Medina), (Col. M. Bladimir Stiven),
(Col. M. Jacobo Arenas)




Use of explosive element 9 12;33 1;51
Vehicle theft/retention 9 12;33 1;73
Combats with Colombian Armed
Forces
8 10;96 1;31
Kidnappings 6 8;22 3;51
Attacks to civilian installations 4 5;48 10;53
Attacks to public force installa-
tions
3 4;11 4;23
Civilian murders 3 4;11 1;60
Attacks to public force 2 2;74 1;22
Electric infrastructure attacks 2 2;74 0;91
Town and village attacks 2 2;74 2;47
Massacres 2 2;74 0;80
Bridges and roads blown 2 2;74 1;13
Kidnappees liberated 1 1;37 0;62
Gas cylinder recovery/theft 1 1;37 0;89
Oil ducts blown 1 1;37 0;52
Assault on tolls and banks 0 0;00 0;00
Fugue 0 0;00 0;00
Town and village harassment 0 0;00 0;00
Electoral material theft/burn 0 0;00 0;00
Armed strike 0 0;00 0;00
Vehicle burn 0 0;00 0;00
* Each group in parenthesis (x, y, z) was treated as a single unit if x, y and z operate jointly.
147.6. Cluster 6
Cluster members*: (15, 48), (35, 37), (37, 42), (38, 56), (8, 15), (Alfonso Castellanos, 28, 45, 10),
(CP. Manuela Beltr¶ an)
Type of act # of acts %of acts in cluster % of acts in sample
Attacks to public force 4 30;77 2;44
Combats with Colombian Armed
Forces
4 30;77 0;66
Town and village harassment 4 30;77 2;33
Oil ducts blown 1 7;69 0;52
Assault on tolls and banks 0 0;00 0;00
Attacks to public force installa-
tions
0 0;00 0;00
Attacks to civilian installations 0 0;00 0;00
Electric infrastructure attacks 0 0;00 0;00
Town and village attacks 0 0;00 0;00




Use of explosive element 0 0;00 0;00
Fugue 0 0;00 0;00
Electoral material theft/burn 0 0;00 0;00
Vehicle theft/retention 0 0;00 0;00
Kidnappees liberated 0 0;00 0;00
Massacres 0 0;00 0;00
Armed strike 0 0;00 0;00
Vehicle burn 0 0;00 0;00
Gas cylinder recovery/theft 0 0;00 0;00
Kidnappings 0 0;00 0;00
Bridges and roads blown 0 0;00 0;00
* Each group in parenthesis (x, y, z) was treated as a single unit if x, y and z operate jointly.
157.7. Cluster 7
Cluster members*: (43), (13, 32, 49, 61), (14, 15), (2, MIBOL), (13, 14, 15), (38, 46), (9, 47), (52,54),
(CP. Enrique Villamizar)
Type of act # of acts %of acts in cluster % of acts in sample
Attacks to public force installa-
tions
9 21;95 12;68
Vehicle theft/retention 4 9;76 0;77
Oil ducts blown 4 9;76 2;09
Bridges and roads blown 4 9;76 2;26
Combats with Colombian Armed
Forces
3 7;32 0;49
Explosive element 3 7;32 0;50
Vehicle burn 3 7;32 7;50
Attacks to public force 2 4;88 1;22
Electric infrastructure attacks 2 4;88 0;91
Civilian murders 2 4;88 1;07
Town and village harassment 2 4;88 1;16
Kidnappees liberated 1 2;44 0;62
Massacres 1 2;44 0;40
Kidnappings 1 2;44 0;58
Assault on tolls and banks 0 0;00 0;00
Attacks to civilian installations 0 0;00 0;00




Fugue 0 0;00 0;00
Electoral material theft/burn 0 0;00 0;00
Armed strike 0 0;00 0;00
Gas cylinder recovery/theft 0 0;00 0;00
* Each group in parenthesis (x, y, z) was treated as a single unit if x, y and z operate jointly.
167.8. Cluster 8
Cluster members*: (39), (65), (10, 45), (24, 57), (4, 5), (13, 49), (Alfonso Castellanos), (CP. Ricardo
Franco), (Joselo Lozada)
Type of act # of acts %of acts in cluster % of acts in sample
Civilian murders 8 38;10 4;28
Attacks to civilian installations 3 14;29 7;89
Combats with Colombian Armed
Forces
3 14;29 0;49
Oil ducts blown 2 9;52 1;05




Use of explosive element 1 4;76 0;17
Kidnappees liberated 1 4;76 0;62
Massacres 1 4;76 0;40
Attacks to public force 0 0;00 0;00
Attacks to public force installa-
tions
0 0;00 0;00
Electric infrastructure attacks 0 0;00 0;00
Town and village attacks 0 0;00 0;00
Fugue 0 0;00 0;00
Town and village harassment 0 0;00 0;00
Electoral material theft/burn 0 0;00 0;00
Vehicle theft/retention 0 0;00 0;00
Armed strike 0 0;00 0;00
Vehicle burn 0 0;00 0;00
Gas cylinder recovery/theft 0 0;00 0;00
Kidnappings 0 0;00 0;00
Bridges and roads blown 0 0;00 0;00
* Each group in parenthesis (x, y, z) was treated as a single unit if x, y and z operate jointly.
177.9. Cluster 9
Cluster members*: (66), (16, 10 y 29), (2, 8, Col. M. Jacobo Arenas), (2,17), ( 2, 16, 39) (32, 48,
49), (51, 53) (Col. M. Arturo Ruiz), (Jacobo Prias)
Type of act # of acts %of acts in cluster % of acts in sample
Kidnappings 6 28;57 3;51
Town and village attacks 4 19;05 4;94
Combats with Colombian Armed
Forces
4 19;05 0;66
Kidnappees liberated 3 14;29 1;86
Attacks to public force installa-
tions
1 4;76 1;41
Civilian murders 1 4;76 0;53
Massacres 1 4;76 0;40
Oil ducts blown 1 4;76 0;52
Assault on tolls and banks 0 0;00 0;00
Attacks to public forces 0 0;00 0;00
Attacks to civilian installations 0 0;00 0;00




Use of explosive element 0 0;00 0;00
Fugue 0 0;00 0;00
Town and village harassment 0 0;00 0;00
Electoral material theft/burn 0 0;00 0;00
Vehicle theft/retention 0 0;00 0;00
Armed strike 0 0;00 0;00
Vehicle burn 0 0;00 0;00
Gas cylinder recovery/theft 0 0;00 0;00
Bridges and roads blown 0 0;00 0;00
* Each group in parenthesis (x, y, z) was treated as a single unit if x, y and z operate jointly.
18